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ABSTRACT
In contemporary metaphysics the struggle between realism and nominalism is
apparent and important, but it tends to overshadow the struggle within realism itself. As
a realist, D.M. Armstrong is very aware of this internal struggle and forms a theory of
universals at the heart of this issue. His theory is based on the naturalistic notion that the
physical universe is all that there is. This naturalism leads him to formulate the Principle
of Instantiation, stating that all universals must be instantiated in a particular. That is,
there can be no universals that are uninstantiated and thus reside in what has become
known as a “Platonic heaven”. Many other realists challenge the Principle of
Instantiation and claim that realism yields a Platonic realm of the Forms that houses all
universals. These other realists also argue that contrary to Armstrong’s view realism is
not compatible with naturalism. In this paper, I argue that Armstrong’s theory of
universals has the resources to resist this criticism. I will show that by adopting his
theory of universals, the combination of realism and naturalism is attainable. Along with
this combination and the Principle of Instantiation, Armstrong maintains a legitimate
theory, which holds strength within this metaphysical debate.
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INTRODUCTION
It is believed by most that there are concrete entities in our world. That is, things
that exist in time and/or space.1 Most would also agree that these concrete things are
particulars. And if we assume that these particulars are the things that make up our
concrete world, we can assume that “particulars have properties and stand in relations to
other particulars.”2 For example, a baseball is a particular thing, and this particular thing
can be said to have the property of being white and the relation of being in my baseball
glove. The question then, which gives rise to a controversy within metaphysics, is what
these properties and relations are. (I.e., What is the white of the baseball and the in
between the baseball and the glove?) Are they part of or separate from particulars? Do
they exist in time and/or space? If they do not exist in time and/or space, do they exist
somewhere? Are they shared among particulars? The different answers to these
questions are where many metaphysicians are divided.
The main division here is a result of the last questions posed: Are they (i.e.
properties and relations) shared among particulars? Within metaphysics there are those
who answer ‘yes’ to this question and believe that multiple particulars can share the same
properties and/or relations. For example, two different baseballs could simultaneously
both possess, or what we will refer to as instantiate, the property white and the relation in.

1

Some authors (e.g. Grossmann 1992) refer to concrete things as spatial and/or temporal because,
according to them, such things as thoughts can be temporally located but not spatially located.
2
Armstrong, Nominalism 11.
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This set of metaphysicians, called realists, refers to these properties and relations as
universals and claims that these universals can be simultaneously located in multiple
particulars. The contrast to realism is a view referred to as nominalism. Nominalism
rejects the theory that particulars can share the same properties and relations. For the
sake of this essay, we will be putting nominalism aside and focusing, for the most part,
on realism and the questions and controversy that arise within.
Realism is thought to be first formulated by Plato. In the Platonic dialogue titled
Parmenides, a philosopher addresses Socrates and says, “. . . there are certain forms from
which these other things (i.e. particulars), by getting a share of them (forms), derive their
names – as, for instance, they come to be like by getting a share of likeness, large by
getting a share of largeness, and just and beautiful by getting a share of justice and beauty
. . .”3 The philosopher addressing Socrates in this passage is Parmenides, and he is
referring to the Platonic forms which are the entities that, for example, give beautiful
particulars beauty and large particulars largeness. In other words, Plato believed that
there was a realm separate from our worldly realm that housed what he referred to as
forms. His forms or ideas resided outside our known world and give particulars their
properties (e.g., they give beautiful particulars beauty.). These forms are what modern
philosophers refer to as universals, and it is the questions that surround these universals
that have caused much controversy between realists themselves.
The question of what universals are has caused a divide within realism. Some
realists side with Plato and claim that universals can reside outside particulars, while
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others believe that universals must be properties or relations that belong to a particular.
Therefore, Platonists claim that universals are abstract entities that do not need particulars
in order to exist while other metaphysicians denounce the existence of a “Platonic
heaven” that houses all the universals that exist. They believe that universals only exist
in the particular that instantiates them.
One of the main problems that has risen out of realism encompasses this idea of
instantiation. Instantiation occurs when a particular has properties or stands in relations.
If one were to observe this particular, its properties, and relations, one would be
observing this particular instantiating these properties and relations. For example, a red
pen that is inside a box could be instantiating the property of redness and the relation
being inside-ness. The redness and being inside-ness of the pen are the property and
relation that the particular pen is instantiating. The question that causes problems to arise
is whether these universals must be instantiated. Some, such as Alan Donagan, Michael
Loux, and Reinhardt Grossmann, say that all universals do not necessarily have to be
instantiated. And others, such as D. M. Armstrong, claim that all universals must be
instantiated (not necessarily now), thus accepting what Armstrong refers to as the
Principle of Instantiation, which states that for every universal (property or relation) there
must be a particular that instantiates that universal.4
Armstrong endorses this principle because, as he points out in his book A World
of States of Affairs, he supports the doctrines of both naturalism and physicalism.
Naturalism is the idea that all the entities in our world of space and time are all that there

4
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is. That is, nothing exists outside of our world of space and time. Physicalism goes
along with naturalism by claiming that all that exists in our spatiotemporal world is
governed by the laws of physics.5 The problem that has risen out of Armstrong’s support
for both realism and naturalism is the problem of uninstantiated universals. When it
comes to those that support realism, the acceptance of uninstantiated universals is
common. Armstrong, on the other hand, does not want to accept uninstantiated
universals because he believes this entails that something is outside of our spatiotemporal
world. He wants to support the idea of universals, but he wants them to be entities that
must exist and be instantiated in particulars that exist in the world as we know it. This is
a very bold claim and because of its boldness, it leaves itself open to question.
In the following pages, I will be questioning D. M. Armstrong’s view of
universals and the Principle of Instantiation. That is, I will be questioning his version of
natural realism and if it is plausible. First, I will look more closely at universals by
examining Armstrong’s view. Then I will state his case for the Principle of Instantiation
(i.e. that there are no universals that are outside of our spatiotemporal world), and follow
that with an analysis of those who support the view of uninstantiated universals. Finally,
I will look at the viability of Armstrong’s outlook to see if it is plausible to be a naturalist
and a realist at the same time.
UNIVERSALS
To understand the Principle of Instantiation we must first understand what
universals are and how they work. To do this I will be accepting Armstrong’s view from

5
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his 1989 work titled Universals: An Opinionated Introduction. In chapter five,
Universals as Attributes, Armstrong explains his theory and in doing so he first rejects
the bundle theory, which is the theory that particulars are only a bundle of properties.6
Following this rejection he addresses the idea of uninstantiated universals and the
problems that go along with them. He then illustrates his view of universals and how
they function in our world.
As mentioned, the bundle theory claims that particulars are nothing other than a
bundle of properties. Armstrong believes this view creates problems because of the
Identity of Indiscernibles; the notion that two particulars that have the same properties are
identical. Thus, if two bundles had the same properties they would be the same
particular.7 This principle seems strange, but one can see that it is necessary if one were
to accept the bundle theory. If two things share the same properties and relations, and
nothing distinguishes them from each other, would they be the same thing? They would
be according to this principle and therefore according to the bundle theory. But it seems
absurd to think that two different particulars that have the same properties are truly
identical, and it also seems absurd to think that two particulars could not be composed of
the same properties.8 For example, we can imagine two hats that share the same
properties. If we follow the Identity of Indiscernibles principle, we have to conclude that
these are identical and thus the same. It is absurd to say that they are the same because
we have two of them, but it does not seem strange to have or imagine two hats that have

6

Armstrong, Universals 62.
On page 61-62 of Universals: An Opinionated Introduction Armstrong claims that temporal and spatial
location does not count as properties.
8
Armstrong, Universals 66-67.
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the same properties. If we can have two hats with the same properties that are still not
the same hat, there must be something other than the properties that distinguishes them.
This other thing is the particular that instantiates these properties. Therefore, it seems
that the Identity of Indiscernibles in connection with the bundle theory causes
inconsistency.
Another reason Armstrong finds the bundle theory to be incompatible with a
theory of universals is that it causes universals to be the substances that make up our
world. If particulars are just bundles of universals and are not separate from the
universals, our world would only consist of universals. Thus, it would allow universals
to be independent substances that all particulars are composed of. According to
Armstrong, the world cannot be made up of only universals because it seems absurd to
have properties in the world that are not the properties of anything.9 As I have mentioned
and will go into more detail about later, Armstrong does not want to accept properties
(universals) that are not the properties of anything (i.e. not instantiated by a particular).
So, Armstrong supports the substance-attribute theory of universals and particulars in lieu
of the bundle theory.
Once Armstrong rejects the bundle theory, he wants to accept the Principle of
Instantiation, but before we look at that principle let’s examine how his universals look.
In this chapter, one of the first things Armstrong explains is what constitutes a universal
and what does not. He addresses three issues regarding universals: Are there disjunctive
universals? Are there negative universals? and Are there conjunctive universals? A

9
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disjunctive universal would be a universal that was linked together by disjunction. For
example, being red or being square would be considered a disjunctive universal.
Armstrong says that this cannot be a universal because a blue square and a red ball would
then have the disjunctive universal of being red or being square, but they would not share
anything in common. As for negative universals, Armstrong again claims that they are
not universals. Lacking a property is not a universal in itself and it does not explain the
particular by any means. For example, not being a car explains nothing about our red
ball and thus is not a property.10 The last type of universal that Armstrong addresses is
conjunctive universals, which he believes can be actual universals. A conjunctive
universal is the notion of having two properties, together, as a single universal for one
particular. For example, a red ball does not just have the properties of being red and
being spherical separately, but it has the conjunctive property of being red and being
spherical together. According to Armstrong, this is not only a universal, but it has the
possibility of having more power than the sum of the two properties if they were
instantiated by themselves.11 A way to further understand this would be to think of a
symphony orchestra. The symphony orchestra as a whole (all the instruments playing
together) can be thought to have much more power than each instrument individually.
One can imagine listening to Beethoven’s 9th symphony as a whole and listening to each
instrument playing the same piece individually. The symphony as a whole has much
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It was brought to my attention during a presentation I gave on Armstrong in a graduate level metaphysics
course that not being a female does give us information about a particular person. But this is only the case
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(being male) and it does not show any presence or power in the particular.
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more impact and power than that of the individual instruments. Conjunctive universals
can be seen the same way. That is, properties instantiated together could have more
power than if they were instantiated individually. So, Armstrong claims that disjunctive
and negative universals cause problems within his view, but conjunctive universals fit
into his system.
To go into more detail on Armstrong’s universals, he describes what he refers to
as states of affairs. A state of affairs is “a particular’s having a certain property, or two or
more particulars standing in a certain relation.”12 In other words, particulars have
properties and relations. These properties and relations are universals. Universals and
particulars are constituents of states of affairs. Thus, any particular and its instantiated
properties is a state of affairs. Armstrong refers to particulars which are conceptually
stripped of their properties as thin particulars and particulars with all of their properties as
thick particulars (or states of affairs). Thin particulars are only concepts in our mind and
they do not occur in our world because universals give particulars nature, kind, and sort,
and without universals being instantiated a particular would have no nature, kind, or
sort.13 Thus, a particular only exists when it is instantiating properties and relations.
Therefore, thick particulars are thin particulars and their properties, and these thick
particulars or states of affairs are what make up our world. For example, a thin particular
with its properties yields a state of affairs which is a particular and thus not repeatable.
This state of affairs can then have a relation that yields a new particular. This acquiring
of properties and relations and yielding of more complex particulars is what our world is

12
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made of. Everything that makes up our universe is anything from a thin particular with a
property to complex thick particulars. Even our universe itself is a complex thick
particular or state of affairs.14
After we come to realize what particulars, universals, and states of affairs are,
Armstrong wants to explain why these properties and relations have to occur with the
particular. In order to help in the understanding of this, he references a book by David
Seargent where Seargent points out that universals should be thought of as ways.
Properties are ways things are and relations are ways things stand to each other.
Armstrong references this because it allows us to understand that universals are not
“floating free,” but are the ways a particular thing is. They exist because of each other,
not separate from each other.15
As has been shown, Armstrong has a substance-attribute view of particulars and
universals. There are particulars and universals that make up states of affairs. These
universals are the ways particulars are and these states of affairs are that which makes up
our universe. Now that we have a grasp of universals, we will focus on the instantiation
of universals through the Principle of Instantiation.
PRINCIPLE OF INSTANTIATION
The Principle of Instantiation of universals is the notion that for every universal
there must be at least one particular that instantiates it.16 That is to say that every
universal must be instantiated (in the past, present, or future), and that there are no
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uninstantiated universals. The opposite of this principle, or the belief that there are
uninstantiated universals, goes back to Plato. One of the major problems concerning this
Platonic idea is the question of where these universals are. If a universal is not
instantiated by a particular, where does it reside? Properties and relations that are not
found in a particular and not found in our world of time and space must reside outside of
our spatiotemporal world in what is known as a “Platonic heaven.” And if there is a
Platonic heaven where uninstantiated universals are, we should place all universals there
because even instantiated universals might not have been or might not be instantiated at
all times.17
These universals that are not instantiated give us an odd view of properties,
relations, and particulars. This view causes universals to be seen as universalia ante res,
or universals before things. If we think of universals before things and in a separate
realm from out spatiotemporal realm, we then have to view particulars as “bloblike”
because they have no structure if they do not have properties. Armstrong would prefer to
view particulars as a “layer-cake” or as a thick particular. That is, as a particulars with
layers of properties and relations. Also, with uninstantiated universals we are inclined to
accept this Platonic heaven, which we have to give way to if there are uninstantiated
universals. We can easily accept our own spatiotemporal world where we observe the
instantiation of properties, but to assume there is a world out there for uninstantiated
universals is a lot to ask for, or at least that is what Armstrong believes.18

17
18
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Although it may seem to be asking for too much to put all our universals in a
Platonic heaven, there are reasons behind this Platonic theory. Predicates can be turned
into general terms (e.g. predicate: red; general term: redness) and these general terms are
the universals of particulars that satisfy these predicates. There is not a problem when we
elicit predicates such as ‘red’, but when we elicit a word such as ‘unicorn’ we run into a
problem. Since ‘unicorn’ is not an instantiated universal, must there be uninstantiated
universals? Armstrong would say no and claim that this is not a problem because there
are words such as ‘unicorn’ that do not refer to particulars in our world. To show this he
references Gilbert Ryle’s ‘Fido’-Fido fallacy, where Ryle points out that all names (e.g.
‘Fido’) do not have to correspond to a particular object. Therefore, using the proper
name ‘Fido’ does not mean there has to be a general term corresponding to it and
therefore a universal.19
Another way Armstrong could alleviate this problem is to evoke his combinatorial
theory of possibility. This theory states that possible particulars are just a combination of
particulars that actually exist.20 Therefore, particulars with properties and relations in
possible worlds are just a recombination of the properties and relations in our actual
world. This recombination can be easily seen in the case of the unicorn. A unicorn can
exist in a possible world because it is a construction of properties (e.g. horseness) that are
instantiated in the actual world. It does not possess any universals that do not exist in our
actual world so there is no need for uninstantiated universals in this case. Thus, one can

19
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have the concept or idea of a particular that does not exist in our actual world, but this
concept or idea need not yield uninstantiated universals.
Using the combinatorial theory of possibility works with such predicates as
‘unicorn’, but what about putative universals that are not instantiated in our world?
Cannot we think of a predicates that is not a recombination of actual instantiated
universals? If this is the case, then Armstrong can just go back to the ‘Fido’-Fido fallacy.
There are terms that do not correspond to particular objects. Therefore, if the
combinatorial theory cannot be applied to a predicate that does not seem to be
instantiated, then the idea that not all predicates correspond to a universal will.
Plato also thought uninstantiated universals were necessary because of the
imperfections we have in our world. He claimed that there is nothing in our world that is
actually perfect. There are no perfect straight lines or circles and no perfect forms of
justice. These instances in our world fall short of perfection so there must be a Platonic
heaven where a perfect straight line, a perfect circle, and a perfect form of justice reside.
But, as Armstrong asks, cannot perfection just be a thought in our mind? And cannot
these things appear to be perfect even if they are not?21 I do not believe this is a stretch at
all. It is easy to think of something as more perfect than it actually is. We seem to do
this all the time by convincing ourselves that something is perfect when it really is not.
Also, things can appear to be perfect as in the case of a perfect circle or line. One can
look at a line that has a slight curve in it and believe it to be straight.

21
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What about concepts in the mind that have never been instantiated by a
particular? Do these ideas have to be uninstantiated universals? Armstrong uses the
example of a wallpaper design that has never been and never will be instantiated by a
particular wallpaper. Some might consider this a universal that is not and never will be
instantiated. Here Armstrong does not reference his combinational theory of possibility,
but it does work for this instance. A wallpaper designer might have a design in his/her
head, but just never happened use this design on any particular wallpaper. This design is
not like any other design, but its properties are not properties that have never been
instantiated. The design will still have colors and shapes that are or have been
instantiated thus it will possess no uninstantiated universals. This design is one that
would occur in a possible world and would then just be a recombination of the actual
world’s instantiated universals.
CRITICISM OF ARMSTRONG
Along with Plato, Alan Donagan refers to and supports the notion of
uninstantiated universals in a 1963 issue of The Monist. Here he is analyzing Bertrand
Russell’s theory of universals from his book titled The Problems of Philosophy. Russell,
a realist, is claiming that in order to understand the statement “I am in my room” we must
understand I, my room, and in. I and my room are not that difficult to grasp because they
are names of things or particulars, but in is not as obvious. Russell says that “in has
meaning; it denotes a relation which holds between me and my room,” and in can be
instantiated in many places so it is real and it is a universal.22 After going over Russell’s
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view, Donagan claims that in can hold true for a negative statement just as it can for an
affirmative one (I am not in my room/I am in my room), and he even points out where
Russell states that negative facts are possible. With this being said, Donagan believes
that Russell’s theory shows support for uninstantiated universals just as it would for
instantiated ones. On the other hand, Russell evades this problem by accepting the
Principle of Acquaintance. This principle claims that “in every proposition that we can
apprehend all the constituents are really entities with which we have immediate
acquaintance.”23 That is, we can only contemplate those things that we are acquainted
with. If we are not acquainted with something, we cannot comprehend or make
judgments about that thing. Thus we cannot think of negative propositions because we
are not acquainted with the negation.24 Donagan attempts to refute this assertion by
claiming that there can be actual relations that we are not acquainted with. For example,
there might be a relationship between two particulars that we are not aware of and do not
have language for. So saying that two particulars have a relation that you are not
acquainted with is a coherent statement. If one could think of a case of an instantiated
universal that one were not acquainted with, one could also think of an uninstantiated
universal that one were not acquainted with. Thus, we have uninstantiated universals.25
I can understand the claim that there are instantiated universals that we are not
aware of, acquainted with, or do not have the language to express. It is not hard to
imagine two particulars that have some relation that has either not been discovered or
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cannot be comprehended by our human minds. For example, it is possible that there is a
universal, let’s call it universal a, that humans are not acquainted with, yet it is
instantiated by particular X. The idea of there being universals that I am not aware of is
not a stretch of the imagination. On the other hand, it seems counterintuitive to say that
two particulars do not share a relation (negative property) that I am not familiar with.
Then, instead of particular X instantiating a universal that I am not aware of, particular X
would not be instantiating a universal that I am not aware of. That is, there is a universal
that one would not be aware of that is not instantiated in a particular. This would then
seem to be asserting the idea that there are uninstantiated universals, but we are just not
acquainted with them. Regardless of this claim of unfamiliar uninstantiated universals,
this would not go against Armstrong’s view of universals. These uninstantiated
universals that the particulars have would be seen as negative universals, which are not
accepted as universals. Not having a property, whether we are familiar with that property
or not, is not in itself a universal. Therefore, Donagan’s notion of uninstantiated
universals would not fit into Armstrong’s theory of universals.
Another contemporary philosopher that shows support for uninstantiated
universals is Michael Loux. He claims that there are universals that are always
instantiated in all possible worlds, such as “being colored if green” and “being selfidentical”, some are sometimes instantiated in all possible worlds, such as being red, and
some are never instantiated in any possible world, such as bachelors being married.26
Loux claims that our actual world is just a possible world, and that there are universals
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that are sometimes true in all possible worlds, which are instantiated in our actual world
and not necessarily instantiated in other possible worlds. For example, redness is
instantiated in our actual world, but there is a possible world where nothing is red
because redness is not instantiated in any particular. Thus, we have possible worlds with
uninstantiated universals. This does not cause a problem because even though Loux
declares that our actual world is just one possible world it is really more than that. Our
actual world is one of the worlds that was possible, but the difference is that now it is
actual and this is the line of argument that Armstrong would take. To once again call
upon Armstrong’s combinatorial theory of possibility, possible worlds are just a
recombination of that which is actualized in our actual world. Therefore, possible worlds
are dependent on what is actualized, and are thus just philosophical ideas that enable
philosophers to talk about possibility.
Regardless of the distinction between possible worlds and our actual world, Loux
goes on to claim that since there could be universals that are instantiated in the actual
world and not in another possible world, there could be universals that are instantiated in
another possible world and not in the actual world.27 But this claim that there are
universals that are instantiated in possible worlds that are not instantiated in our actual
world contradicts Armstrong’s combinatorial theory of possibility. To restate the theory,
Armstrong’s view is that universals in possible worlds are just recombinations of the
universals that are instantiated in our actual world. Thus, there could be no universals
that are instantiated in a possible and not in the actual world because those properties and

27
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relations that are in possible worlds are only the ones that are in our actual world.
Therefore, there are no uninstantiated universals.
One last view to look at is that of Reinhardt Grossmann. In Grossmann’s book,
The Existence of the World, he differentiates between what he refers to as the views of an
ontologist and a naturalist. An ontologist believes there to be two types of entities:
individual entities and property entities. Individual entities are ones that are both
temporal and spatial while property entities are atemporal and non-spatial.28 The
contrasting view is that of a naturalist who claims there is only that which is temporal and
spatial.29 That is, the naturalist believes that not only particulars are temporal and spatial,
but properties are as well. Grossmann takes the side of the ontologist, and in doing so,
describes what he calls the universe and the world. Grossmann’s universe is the universe
as we know it. It consists of all the concrete things we know about: atoms, molecules,
plants, animals, solar systems, galaxies, etc. Therefore, the individual entities the
ontologist claims are temporal and spatial are those that make up the universe. The world
on the other hand is what Grossmann identifies as the place that houses the properties and
abstract things that do not belong to the universe.30 In other words, the universe is our
concrete realm and the world is the abstract realm that some might refer to as the
“Platonic heaven”.
A naturalist, on the other hand, not only claims that the universe is all that exists,
but he also claims, as is the case of Armstrong, that physics explains all that there is. If
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he were ordered to give up naturalism, he would be forced to give up physics as well
because there would be entities (i.e. universals) that were not explained by physics.
Therefore, the ontologists would then believe that “the structure of the world is the proper
subject of study for the philosopher, while the universe is the proper subject of study for
the scientist”31, while the naturalist would probably claim that the universe is the proper
subject of study for both the scientists and philosophers. The ontologist, with the
acceptance of Grossmann’s world, would have to accept the idea of uninstantiated
universals because of the atemporal non-spatial world, and the naturalist would have to
deny uninstantiated universals because of their denial for Grossmann’s world.
As mentioned before, Armstrong’s view is that of a naturalist that claims both
naturalism and physicalism. He wants to take the universe to be all that there is and
claim that physics explains all that is in the universe. On the other hand, Grossmann
allows there to be a realm, the world, which is separate from the universe and is not
governed by the science of physics. When it came to Donagan and his acceptance of
negative universals or Loux and his idea of possible worlds, Armstrong took issue with
these claims and seemed to have an answer. But with Grossmann, there seems to be a
larger amount on pressure on Armstrong’s view of realism.
DOES ARMSTRONG’S VIEW STAND UP TO THE CRITICISM?
For the most part we have mapped out Armstrong’s view of universals and how it
aids the Principle of Instantiation. His view allows us to “bring universals down to earth”
where we can observe their instantiation. Disregarding his view causes us to invent, as
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he claims, a nonmaterial world or Platonic heaven that is not necessary for our ontology.
His view allows us to refute the claim that universals can be negative properties, and it
allows us to see universals as things that are only instantiated in our actual world. But of
course this is not a foolproof system. If it were, there would be no need for philosophical
inquiry. So, we now turn to the problems that lie within this view of universals to see if
his view is strong enough to resist the criticism.
In his chapter Universals as Attributes, Armstrong claims that we should dismiss
a Platonic heaven because it is a “mere hypothesis” that cannot be proven. This is a
relevant claim, but just because a Platonic heaven is easily doubted does not mean that it
is not real. Those who support uninstantiated universals do not claim that the existence
of uninstantiated universals has been proven, but their existence has not been disproved
either.32 We must then ask ourselves what is the more plausible view for modern realism.
In criticizing Armstrong’s form of realism, Grossmann also points out that a
naturalistic realist view such as Armstrong’s could be inconsistent. He shows that
naturalism could be looked at in two ways: pure naturalism and impure naturalism. A
pure naturalist integrates naturalism with nominalism, and therefore rejects universals
and accepts entities as in time and space. In contrast with this pure form, impure
naturalism combines naturalism and realism and therefore also accepts entities as in time
and space, but includes universals. Impure naturalism would also accept particulars as
having a single location and universals as having multiply locations. Therefore, an
impure naturalist would have to reject what is referred to as the axiom of localization
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(“No entity whatsoever can exist at different places at once or at interrupted time
intervals.”) because the impure naturalist accepts universals as being multiply located.33
Armstrong’s view could be seen as an impure naturalist view of universals. He is not
willing to allow for uninstantiated universals, yet he is a naturalist and a realist. That is,
he is a realist so he accepts universals and he is a naturalist so he only allows for entities
in time and space (some, particulars, being singly located and others, universals, as
multiply located). The problem that lies here is that Armstrong, as mentioned before, is
also a physicalist and believes that all things within our universe (which is all that there
is) are explained by physics. Rejecting the axiom of localization seems to be a
contradiction to physics because it allows for entities to be multiply located. It seems that
a realist that would reject this axiom would also reject the naturalist idea of the universe.34
That is, Grossmann expects a naturalist to accept the axiom of localization because our
universe is all that exists and physics tells us to accept the idea that things are not
multiply located. On the other hand, Armstrong accepts that our universe is all that there
is and that physics explains the laws of our universe, but he also wants to accept the
multiple locations of universals. Grossmann wants to say that this is a rather
counterintuitive way of thinking and therefore harms Armstrong’s cause, but this is not
necessarily the case. Armstrong is willing to accept our universe as all that there is and
physics as governing all that there is while rejecting the axiom of localization. He can do
so because universals are instantiated in particulars and are thus located in time and
space. Physics governs the laws of particulars and universals are properties that these
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particulars instantiate. Therefore, physics is not undermined by the fact that universals
are multiply located because universals are not the concrete entities that physics can
explain.
As for instantiation, Armstrong allows it to be in the past, present, or future. This
means that universals can be instantiated in the past and not instantiated in the present or
future, instantiated in the present and not the past or future, instantiated in the future and
not in the past or present, or in any combination of the three. But then do these properties
and relations that are not particulars act like particulars? Meaning, can they cease to exist
just as a particular does? For example, did species that are currently extinct possess
universals that are no longer instantiated? If so, then the universals have to become
extinct along with the species, otherwise they would currently be uninstantiated and need
a place to reside (Platonic heaven). To alleviate this problem, past universals should be
thought of as ceasing to exist with whatever instantiated them.35 As for universals that
will be instantiated in the future, they can just be thought of as universals that have not
come into existence yet. When some new particular comes into existence the way it is or
the way it stands to others will come into existence as well. Thus, there is no need for
uninstantiated universals. Regardless, if universals have existed in the past and not
currently or will exist in the future and not currently, we cannot think of them going
somewhere after they exist or being somewhere before they exist. If we do not think
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along these lines, we would have to give way to a Platonic heaven or give way to
accepting only currently instantiated universals which is not what we are trying to do.
But before we leave this last topic, let’s take another look at Loux’s claim about
possible worlds. Loux says that there are universals that are instantiated in our actual
world and not in possible worlds; therefore there could be universals that are instantiated
in possible worlds and not our actual world. This problem seemed to be alleviated by
Armstrong’s combinatorial theory of possibility, but does this combinatorial theory refer
only to universals that are currently instantiated? Can past universals be instantiated in
possible worlds? If a past universal ceases to exist in our actual world, it seems plausible
to still have it instantiated in a possible world. But this would then give us an
uninstantiated universal in our actual world, which would violate the Principle of
Instantiation. To make this clearer let’s refer to the example of the dinosaurs. If the
dinosaurs instantiated a universal that is no longer instantiated, it seems that it could still
be instantiated in a possible world where the dinosaurs never became extinct. Then this
dinosaur universal would be uninstantiated in our actual world. How would Armstrong
correct this problem?
One way to view this problem would be to view universals that have ceased to
exist (i.e. past universals) as universals that could exist in other possible worlds. That is,
a dinosaur could have instantiated a universal that is no longer instantiated in our actual
world, but could still be instantiated in a possible world. If we had universals that were
instantiated in other possible worlds and not our actual world, some would say that we
have uninstantiated universals. If these universals were considered to be uninstantiated,
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they would not be able to be accepted as universals under Armstrong’s theory.
Therefore, it would be impossible to have past universals that are instantiated in other
possible worlds and not in our actual world. But if there cannot be past universals, all our
universals would have to be currently or future instantiated universals. If this were the
case, Armstrong could deal with this problem by again trying to employ his
combinatorial theory of possibility. In the case of the dinosaurs, he could say that the
dinosaurs possessed the same universals that are instantiated currently, but they are just
arranged in a different way. This is not too hard to imagine because dinosaurs do seem to
possess similar properties to things that exist in today’s world (e.g. animality, movability,
etc.). But then, if all universals that were instantiated by past particulars were still
instantiated today, we would have no past universals. We would only have currently and
future instantiated universals. This might be possible to think about because, as
mentioned above, there are things of the past that do not exist anymore but could have
instantiated universals that are still instantiated today. For example, dinosaurs could have
instantiated such universals as animality and movability, which are still instantiated
today. If this were the case, universals would have to be basic to persist through time.
That is, the same universals that existed at the beginning of time would have to exist now
because there could be no past universals. This is a far stretch, but it could be possible to
see universals as so simple that they could not cease to exist. Of course new universals
could come into existence, but once they exist they could not die out because, as we
mentioned, a past universal would then exist in a possible world and yield an
uninstantiated universals.
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The concern with this idea is that our universals do seem to cease to exist. That
is, there seems to be properties and relations that were once instantiated by particulars
that are no longer instantiated. In the example of the dinosaurs, it would seem that they
instantiated some dinosaurness that is no longer instantiated, but if this were the case, we
would have past universals. To solve this problem we would have to revamp our
concept of universals, and thus dinosaurness would not be a universal. We could
possibly make universals simpler so that they could persist thought time, but this is
somewhat counterintuitive. Armstrong’s universals are properties and relations that
particulars instantiate, and it seems that properties and relations can possibly cease to
exist. How would Armstrong solve this problem?
Armstrong could try to claim that there are no past instantiated universals, but it is
not likely that he would make this claim. In his theory of universals, he claims that
universals must exist in space and time. If this is so, there can be no uninstantiated
universals because they exist in space and time and are therefore instantiated by
particulars. They are not just free floating entities in our world of space and time, but
they are ways particulars are or ways they stand to other particulars. With this being said,
we must understand that our world of time consists of the past, present, and future. If a
universal existed in our world, it does not just leave our world and go to a Platonic
heaven when the particular that instantiates it ceases to exist. The universal either
continues to exist because it is instantiated in another particular or it ceases to exist along
with its particular. We cannot assume that past universals yield uninstantiated universals
because that would put most of our present universals at risk. For example, if there is a
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universal that is instantiated by humans and only humans, then it is at risk of being a past
universal because it is possible that the human race could cease to exist. Therefore,
universals such as the one in this example are not at risk of becoming uninstantiated
because they were instantiated in time and space. The way something is does not go
somewhere else (Platonic heaven) when the particular ceases to be that way.
If Armstrong does not want to accept uninstantiated universals, then he could be
at risk of giving up past universals as well, but I do not believe that is necessary. His
theory of universals requires universals to be instantiated by particulars and past
universals fit that criterion. On top of that his adoption of an impure form of naturalism
could be seen as contradicting physics, but as mentioned physics explains physical
entities and universals are not that. They are entities that are instantiated by physical
entities (particulars) and physics explains that, but it is not physics’ job to explain the
multiple locations of universals. Therefore, Armstrong’s theory of universals stands up
to the challenge. It is presented with a significant amount of criticism, but it has the
ability to persist making it a rather attractive realist theory of universals.

CONCLUSION
Is Armstrong’s view practical? At first glance his view seems rather coherent and
compatible with a modern view of the world. Particulars can be thought of as thin, but
are actually thick in reality. Universals are ways things are and ways thing stand to each
other, which rids us of the idea that universals are mystical entities that are free of
particulars. They are properties and relations with no negation, which allows a particular
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to have a finite number of universals and thus causing them to be easier to comprehend
and understand. And they are something that must be instantiated, which rids us of a
Platonic heaven. As mentioned before, this does not disprove a Platonic heaven, but it is
more intuitive to look at properties and relations without inventing a place to put them.
The way a thing is or stands to another is not something that can exist on its own. The
redness of a ball cannot exist without the ball so we do not have to think of it as
something that can.
With this being said, there were a few things that threatened Armstrong’s view.
The Principle of Instantiation seems like an excellent way to rid us of a Platonic heaven,
but whether or not this worked for past universals seemed to be a new question. The
question of whether or not physics was threatened by the multiple locations of universals
was also a serious challenge to Armstrong’s theory. Both of these challenges can be dealt
with using Armstrong’s view. Past universals are said to exist in time and space and
therefore do not require the existence of a separate world to house them even if they exist
in the past. As for physics, universals are entities in our concrete world, but not entities
that are concrete. Physics is the science that explains the physical objects of the world,
and universals are only properties of these physical objects. Therefore, universals do not
challenge the legitimacy of physics.
Therefore, Armstrong appears to have a reasonable view of universals. His
explanation makes the combination of realism and naturalism an accurate view of our
actual world. He does not succumb to the temptation of a Platonic heaven and therefore
does not present us with an extreme or odd form of realism. Rather, his adequate view of
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universals along with the Principle of Instantiation is a reasonable realistic analysis for
our modern day view of realism.
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